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Abstract 
In this paper I investigate the effectiveness of the monetary authority's 
borrowing policies in resolving exchange rate crises. I show why obtaining 
loans or lines of credit in foreign currency may avoid, at least temporarily, 
the devaluation of a fixed exchange rate. I also consider the problem of the 
optimal size of the loan and/or the line of credit. The analysis focuses on a 
particular episode of foreign exchange rate pressure, during the troubled 
years between 1894 to 1896. My conclusion is that the borrowing policy 
followed by the U.S. Treasury in those years was effective in avoiding the 
collapse of the United States' gold standard. Moreover, my findings indicate 




Exchange rate crises have recently received considerable attention. 
Theoretical research started by Krugman [1979] and expanded by Flood and 
Garber [1984], Grilli [1986], Obstfeld [1986] among others, has stressed the 
relationship between collapses of fixed exchange rates and speculative runs on 
the international reserves of the monetary authorities. Empirical application 
of these models has been attempted by Blanco and Garber [1986] for the case of 
the recurrant devaluation of the Mexican peso during the 1970's and the early 
1980's. Exchange rate crises, however, are not a recent phenomenon, rather 
they have characterized the history of the international monetary system. The 
abandonment of the gold standard at the start of World War I, the progressive 
deterioration and definitive breakdown of the classical gold standard in the 
20's and early 30's, and the numerous readjustments of the exchange rates 
during the the Bretton-Woods period demonstrate how exchange rate crises are 
not a unique characteristic of contemporary exchange rate systems. 
An interesting empirical problem is to analyze how monetary authorities 
have behaved when faced with such exchange rate emergencies. Typically, in 
these circumstances, foreign exchange authorities have tried to borrow 
international reserves. In this paper I show why obtaining a line of credit 
in foreign currency may be an effective policy in order to avoid a 
devaluation, and I discuss how to determine the optimal size of the loan. 
This is done through the study of a particular episode: the exchange rate 
crises of 1894-96. There are several reasons that justify the choice of this 
specific incident. First, because of a subsequent Congressional 
investigation, we have a complete and detailed record of the actions 
undertaken by the Treasury at that time. Second, I think that it is 
interesting to see how certain policies, typical of today's central bank 
2 
operations, were already known and used in times when a central bank did not 
exist. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section two the essential 
economic and institutional environment of the period is reviewed. Section 
three models the relationship between borrowing and the viability of a gold 
standard. In section four the framework developed in section three is used to 
study the exchange rate crisis of 1894-96. Section five analyzes the issue of 
the optimal amount of foreign exchange loans, and applies the result to 
examine the characteristics of the Treasury borrowing operation of February 
1895. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The Essential Institutional and Economic Environment of the Period1 
After January 1, 1879, as prescribed by the Resumption Act of June 14, 
1875, legal tender paper money had to be redeemable in coins. Even if "coin" 
meant, at the time, either gold or silver, the Treasury always redeemed in 
gold, de facto supporting a gold standard system. 
In order to guarantee the redemption of the notes, the Treasury had two 
alternatives: (i) to use the surplus revenue or (ii) to issue bonds of the 
kind authorized by the Refunding Act (July 14, 1870). 2 
The viability of the gold standard did not present any problems during 
the 80's. In particular, between 1885 and 1890, a constant government surplus 
guaranteed a large amount of gold reserves, well above the required minimum of 
1 For a more detailed analysis of the period, see Garber and Grilli (1985),
and Simons (1968). 
2 The Refunding Act authorized the Treasury to issue three different kinds of 
bonds: (1) 10 year@ 5% (2) 15 year@ 4.5% (3) 30 year@ 4%. 
3 
$100 million. 3 The period of monetary instability started early in the 90's. 
The underlying cause of the precariousness of the period was excess money 
supply that was generated by two different sources: 
(a) Between 1890 and 1893, the Sherman Act caused a steep increase in the 
paper component of the money supply, by forcing the Treasury to make huge 
monthly purchases of silver in exchange for a new kind of paper money (the 
Treasury Notes of the 1890's). 4 
(b) During the years between 1893 and 1896 the Congress did not allow any 
form of borrowing to finance the large and continuous deficit that originated 
in the period. The Treasury had the option of either monetizing the deficit 
by using previously accumulated legal tender, or issuing the kind of bonds 
authorized by the Resumption Act, once the gold reserves had fallen below the 
minimum. 5 
During those years the viability of the gold standard became more and 
more uncertain; the Congress and the Treasury had to take various actions in 
order to avoid its collapse: the Sherman Act was repealed November 1, 1893 
and the Treasury undertook four bond issues, in February 1894 ($50 million), 
3 This lower bound for the gold reserves originated in the Act of July 12, 
1882 which established that any time the gold reserves of the Treasury fell 
below $100 million, the Treasury had to suspend the issuing of gold 
certificates. After that, $100 million was considered to be the minimum level 
of the gold reserves in the Treasury, as set down by the Judiciary Committee 
of the House of Representatives in a report submitted on July 6, 1892. The 
report stated: "That it was the intention of the Congress to fix the minimum 
amount of this reserve fund at $100 million gold and gold bullion, and that it 
should be maintained at that sum, seems clear from the language of the Act [of 
1882]." 
4 The Sherman Silver Purchase Act was passed on July 14, 1890. 
5 Note that, by the Act of May 31, 1878, the Treasury was forbidden to cancel 
or retire any of the U.S. notes then outstanding. 
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in November 1894 ($50 million), in February 1895 ($62.3 million, plus 
approximately $20-25 million in lines of credit), and in January 1896 ($100 
million). 
3. Borrowing Operations and the Viability of the Gold Standard 
This section presents a simple model which permits one to analyze the 
effects of foreign currency borrowing policies on the viability of a gold 
standard. An international gold standard, like the one prevailing in the 
1890's, can be interpreted as a fixed exchange rate regime, where the fixed 
parities are given by the ratios of the gold content of the various 
currencies. Similarly, the gold reserves of the monetary authorities can be 
interpreted as foreign currency reserves. In the rest of the paper, we assume 
that the international economy is composed by two countries: a domestic 
economy (the U.S.), and a foreign economy (the U.K.). 
Formally we can measure the viability of a fixed exchange rate system at 
time t with the probability that a speculative attack on the fixed parity will 
occur at time t+l. This probability function can be obtained from the 
following monetary model of the exchange rate for a small economy: 6 
(1) 
* (2)it - it Et et+l - et 
(3) 
This model has been widely used in speculative attack literature. For a 
more detailed explanation of solutions to these types of models, see Flood and 
Garber (1984a), Blanco and Garber (1986) and Grilli (1986). 
6 
5 
Herem, p, e, and y are the logarithms of money stock, price level, 
exchange rate in dollars per pound and a measure of real activity; i is the 
nominal interest rate and wand u are uncorrelated stochastic disturbances. 
The parameters a, p, ~ are all positive, and Et is the expectation operator 
conditional on information at time t. British variables are marked with 
asterisks, and all variables are assumed to be exogenous to the exchange rate. 7 




- w * -t+j - p t+j u t+j (5) 
The money stock in a gold standard can be defined as the sum of two 
components: (i) the gold in circulation plus the part of the paper money 
backed by gold reserves in the Treasury and (ii) the silver in circulation 
plus the paper money not backed by gold reserve, which I defined as the 
domestic component of the money supply (DCt). 
The basic idea underlying the speculative attack literature is that the 
The actual form of equation (3) that we used in the empirical section is: 
p - +kt 
where k is constant such that mean(e)=mean (p-p*+k). This is to make the 
price levels, which are index numbers, compatible with the exchange rate which 
is in$/ L. 
7 
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fixed parity will be viable until it becomes profitable to attack it. This 
will happen as soon as the exchange rate expected to prevail right after the 
attack (the shadow exchange rate) exceeds the given parity. 8 The level of the 
shadow exchange rate depends critically on what kind of regime is expected to 
prevail once the gold standard collapses. I assume that, in this 
circumstance, a paper money that is convertible in silver will be established. 
In the post-attack regime, to which equations (1) - (5) refer, gold goes 
out of circulation. The money stock is given by the sum of the domestic 
component and the amount of reserves still in the Treasury after the collapse 
of the gold standard. By defining Gm to be the level of gold reserves at 
which the Treasury abandons the defense of the gold standard (5) can be 
rewritten as: 
* (6)wt+j - p t+j - ut+j 
In this framework, the probabilty that a speculative attack will occur in the 
next period is given by: 
Pr( 1!.. ~ [1:a)j Etht+j ~ e) (7) 
j=o 
where e is the fixed parity. It is now easy to see why borrowing gold 
decreases the probability that an attack will occur during the next period. 
We are referring to a buying attack, i.e. when speculators buy foreign 
reserves (gold) from the monetary authorities, expecting to profit from a 
devaluation of the domestic currency. For a model in which selling attacks, 
i.e. attacks aiming to profit from a revaluation of the currency, are also 
considered, see Grilli (1986). 
8 
7 
Borrowing, in fact, reduces the post-attack money supply and, therefore, it 
reduce the level of the h .'s. Similar results can be found in Garber and
t+J 
Grilli (1986) and Buiter (1986). 9 Therefore, to issue bonds or to obtain 
lines of credit provides an effective instrument to enhance the viability of 
the system in the short run. 
If our interpretation of the facts is correct, the probability of a 
speculative attack on the gold standard between 1889 (the year in which our 
analysis starts) and 1896 should have followed a specific time pattern. In 
particular, the probaility should start to increase gradually by mid-1890, 
when the Sherman Act was passed. It should then reach a peak around the end 
of 1893 when the Sherman Act was repealed. From 1894 to 1896 it should 
decrease back toward zero, and the reduction should be concentrated in 
discrete jumps occurring at the time of the borrowing operations. In order to 
verify the validity of our analysis, in the next section we estimate the 
probability of the collapse of the gold standard between January 1889 and 
December 1896. 
4. Estimating the Probability of a Speculative Attack 
In order estimate the probability of a speculative attack we have to 
compute the expected shadow exchange rate, which is a function of all future 
expected ht+j· The first step in our procedure will be to estimate the 
variable ht. This requires estimates of the money demand function and an 
assumption about the value of Gm. In the following we assume that the 
Treasury will give up the defence of the parity once the gold reserves in its 
Buiter also proves that in the long run the probability of an attack will 
increase as a result of borrowing, because of the increase in interest costs. 
9 
8 
vault are completely exausted (i.e. Gm= 0). 
Since we are interested in computing the post-attack floating (shadow) 
exchange rate, we should be estimating the money demand function prevailing 
during the post-attack flexible exchange rate regime. Since the gold standard 
did not collapse, the only data available refers to the fixed exchange rate 
regime. However, the demand for cash balances need not be dependent on the 
particular exchange rate regime. On the contrary, it could be shown that 
under reasonable conditions this will not be the case. 10 I assume that this 
independence property holds and I estimate the money demand equation (1) using 
monthly data in the period 1889:01-1896:12. Given the potential dependence of 
the domestic interest rate on the money supply process, consistent estimates 
were obtained by instrumental variables, using the British interest rate, the 
lagged domestic output and the lagged domestic interest rate as instruments 11 . 
The estimate of the money demand parameters are given in Table 1. All 
coefficients are significative and have the expected signs. We can now 
compute an estimate of ht using equation (6) under the assumption that Gm 0. 
To estimate time t shadow exchange rate we also need to compute Et ht+j for j 
~ 0. In order to calculate these expected values, we must make some 
assumption about the stochastic processes governing the set of state variables 
included in ht. A natural way to interpret ht is as the difference between 
money supply (dct) and the factors determining money demand (i.e. mdt = ~ + 
1Yt+j - ai * t+j + wt+j + p * t+j + ut+j). A crucial characteristic of the period 
10Penati and Pennacchi (1986), for example, show that this type of 
independence holds if the representative agent has a separable logarithmic
utility function in consumption and real cash balances. 
11 In the appendix we provide a detailed description of the data. In obtaining
the estimate presented in Table 1 we also correct for the autocorrelation in 
the residuals. 
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under consideration is the change that took place in the domestic credit 
creation. Two major switches in monetary policy occurred in the 1890's: the 
approval and the subsequent repeal of the Sherman Act. Consequently, we 
decided to break the sample into three parts and to model de. in each period
J 
with different ARIMA processes. On the other hand, there is no reason to 
believe that an analogous shift occurred in the variables generating the 
post-attack money demand. Therefore, a unique ARIMA process for the whole 
period was estimated for md .. The result of the time series identification 
J 
and estimation procedure are summarized in Table 2. While dct appears to be 
AR(l) in all three subperiods, mdt is best approximated by a constant plus 
white noise. 
These estimated processes can be used to compute Et ht+j = Et dct+j - Et 
mdt+j· We now have everything necessary to compute the time series of the 
probability of attack, which is presented in Figure 1. The time pattern 
displayed by this probability confirms our theoretical analysis. The -
viability of the gold standard was not a problem until August of 1890, as 
indicated by the probability of an attack being zero before that period. As 
our model predicted, the probability of collapse of the fixed exchange rate 
regimes increases steadily during the three years following the approval of 
the Sherman Act, reaching a maximum in October 1893, when the Act was 
repealed. Between 1894 and 1896 the probability decreases on average, with 
most of the decline occurring when the borrowing operations were undertaken. 
5. On the Optimal Size of the Loan 
In order to address the issue of the optimal amount of borrowing we have 
to identify the trade-off involved in borrowing international reserves. On 
the one hand, borrowing allows to reduce the probability of a collapse of the 
10 
fixed exchange rate regime, which is considered a valuable arrangement by the 
monetary authority12 On the other hand, the operation is costly in terms of 
interest payments and, more generally, in term of possible increases in the 
interest rate induced by the bond issue. Formally, we can describe the 
problem of determining the optimal size of the loan as follows: 
(P-1) 
where Bt is the amount of the loan, PVC( Bt) is the present value of the cost 
of the borrowing operation, and Ct is the maximum cost that the monetary 
authorities are willing to pay in order to guarantee the viability of the gold 
standard. In addition, in the environment under consideration there existed 
other constraints of institutional nature. Specifically, the Treasury was 
constrained in the choice of borrowing instruments by the Refunding Act (see 
footnote 2). Moreover, such borrowing could take place only in order to 
replenish gold reserves when they had fallen below their minimum level of $100 
millions. 
How can we determine whether the borrowing policy of the Treasury during 
the 1890's was the outcome of an optimization process of the kind described 
above? A minimal test is to verify that the institutional constraints were 
satisfied .. This was indeed the case: the type of bonds used were among the 
ones allowed by the Refunding Act and, at the time of the borrowing 
12Here we do not elaborate on why this might be the case. A paper that 
discusses the optimality of fixed exchange rates is Mundell (1973). 
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operations, the Treasury's gold reserves were below $100 millions (see Figure 
2). In the following, we propose a more interesting way of investigating the 
rationale behind the behavior of the Treasury and the optimality of its 
actions. This will involve the use of information that are revealed by the 
particular circumstances in which the third issue (February, 1895) took place. 
The bond issue of February 1895 is particularly intriguing because in 
that episode, the Treasury used the the services of a syndicate of private 
bankers. The terms of the agreement are stated in the contract that J.P. 
Morgan and August Belmont, as representatives of the syndicate, signed with 
the U.S. Treasury. The Belmont-Morgan contract stipulated the purchase of 
gold coins by the Treasury, in exchange for 30 year 2.4% bonds. The par value 
of the issue was $62.3 million. It was purchased by the syndicate at a price 
equivalent to 3.75% at par. In addition, and of most importance, the 
syndicate agreed that " ... so far as it lies within their power, will exert all 
financial influences and will make all legitimate efforts to protect the 
Treasury of the United States against withdrawls of gold, pending the complete 
performance of the contract." 
With this provision the syndicate granted the Treasury a zero-interest 
line of credit in gold for the duration of the contract. 13 Throughout the 
duration of the contract, in fact, the syndicate delivered between $20 and $25 
million in gold to the Treasury, in exchange for legal tender. This 
operation, therefore, guaranteed the Treasury both a long term financing, i.e. 
the 30 year bonds, and a short term financing, i.e. the line of credit. 
13 The duration of the contract was implicitly fixed at six months. The use 
of the term "line of credit" is perhaps inaccurate in this context. The real 
nature of the deal was an on-call exchange of gold for paper money. The 
contract had additional minor provisions that will not be expressly considered 
in the present paper. For a discussion, see Garber and Grilli (1985). 
12 
Note that the contract has the characteristic of a "firm commitment" 
contract, one by which the investment banker underwrites the entire issue, 
guaranteeing to the issuer a fixed amount of funds. However, the choice of 
this contract, instead of other alternative forms like "best effort," was made 
for other reasons in addition to the insurance advantage. It is quite 
possible that the Treasury expected to be able to market the issue directly, 
at a price higher than the one agreed upon with the syndicate. The spread not 
only compensated the syndicate for undertaking the risk and for the 
distribution efforts, but was also a way to pay for the line of credit. This 
form of contract enabled the Treasury to secure short term financing without 
obtaining an explicit approval from the Congress, which they were not willing 
to concede. 
Following the approach taken above, we view the Belmont-Morgan contract 
as the result of an optimization problem that the Treasury had to solve in 
order to assure the practicability of the gold standard. In addition to the 
constraints we mentioned before, the Treasury had to guarantee a minimum level 
of profit to the syndicate, in order to compensate it for underwritng the bond 
issue and for providing the line of credit. Recalling that the probability of 
a speculative attack is a monotonically decreasing function in the amount of 
gold borrowed, we can express the optimizaton problem as: 
(P-2) max p'N+Gc 
N Ge 
' 
s.t. (a) 1f [p(N) - p' ]N - I(Gc) ~ K 
(b) G T < 100 
0 
(c) r ::S r (or p' ~ max p'min) 
13 
N and GC represent the number of one dollar bonds in the issue and the dollar 
amount of line credit respectively. ~ is the profit of the syndicate; p, a 
function of N, is the price at which the bond is purchased by the public and 
p' is the price at which it is underwritten by the syndicate; I, a function of 
G
e . 
, 1S the cost of providing the line of credit; K is the minimum level of 
profit required by the syndicate in order to perform the services; GT is the 
0 
level of gold reserves in the Treasury before the contract was signed; r is 
the interest rate at which the bond issue is underwritten and r is its max 
maximum possible level. In writing constraint (c) we assumed that the cost of 
the borrowing operation can be approximated by the interest payed on the loan. 
Note that, given the characteristics of the bond (i.e.30 years@ 4%) and 
assuming that the last constraint holds with equality, the knowledge of r 
max 
implies the knowledge of p'.
min
, and vice versa. The maximum allowed yield of 
the operation has been implicitly revealed by the contract itself to be 
r =3.75, and we take it as a given parameter.max 
In order to determine whether the behavior of the Treasury was consistent 
with this interpretation of the facts, we solve the above optimization 
problem, derive the "optimal contract" as prescribed by our theory, and 
compare it with the actual Belmont-Morgan contract. 
The solution of P-2 requires an estimate of constraint (a) which, in 
turn, requires information about the demand for Treasury bonds, p(N), about 
the costs of providing the line of credit, I(Gc), and about the amount of 
profits, K, that the syndicate intended to make. 
a. The Demand for Treasury Bonds 
To derive the relationship between the size of the bond issue and the 
price at which it could have been distributed by the syndicate, the following 
14 
strategy was used. As mentioned in section 2, in November 1894 the Treasury 
issued a $50 million, 10 year bond@ 5%, to replenish the gold reserves that 
had fallen below the required minimum of $100 million. All the bids made for 
the bond are recorded in the report of the investigation conducted by the 
Committee on Finance in 1896. 14 With these data, the demand function faced 
by the Treasury on that occasion can be traced out, and it is presented in 
Figure 3. 
In addition to this function, the report provides an additional piece of 
information. In particular, it reveals that a syndicate of bankers, J.P. 
Morgan among them, 15 made two separate bids for that bond issue. They offered 
to purchase the whole issue at a price of 1.17077 per $1 par value, or to 
purchase any part of it at 1.168898. Note, however, that if the syndicate 
expected to face the same demand function that the Treasury was facing, it 
would have incurred a loss by acquiring the whole issue at 1.17077, since the 
equilibrium price along the Treasury demand curve was 1.16306. If we assume 
that the syndicate was behaving rationally, we have to conclude that it 
expected a larger demand for the bond than the one faced by the Treasury. 
The reason for this difference is that the individuals may have had an 
incentive to report a price to the Treasury that was lower than their true 
reservation price. This is because of the particular structure of the auction 
used to allocate the issue. The Treasury, in fact, was adopting a 
discriminating auction, in which the bonds were assigned at the price bid, 
14 The Committee was appointed to investigate the Treasury bond sales that 
occurred during the years 1894-96. 
15 Contrary to the Belmont-Morgan syndicate, the composition of this 
syndicate is known. Even if we cannot be certain about it, it is very likely
that most of the members of the syndicate of November 1894 were also members 
of the February 1895 syndicate. 
15 
starting from the highest bid and working downward until the whole issue was 
allocated. Under a discriminating auction, the mean and the variance of the 
bids are lower than they would be under competitive auction, under which the 
agent reveals his true reservation price. 16 This implies that the demand 
curve derived from the bids to the Treasury has to be flatter and have a lower 
intercept than the true demand curve, which the syndicate expected to face. 
Despite the fact that the actual allocation mechanism used by the syndicate is 
not known, a close examination and review of the journals of the time suggests 
that competitive auction was utilized. 17 
We must recover the actual demand faced by the syndicate -- a demand 
different from the one faced by the Treasury. Knowledcge of this syndicate's 
demand function will be used to construct an estimate of the demand faced by 
the February 1895 syndicate. Since the two issues occurred within 10 weeks of 
each other, we can make the reasonable assumption that the market demand did 
not change in such a short period of time. As a result, after accounting for 
the fact that part of this demand ($50 million) was satisfied by the November 
issue, we can consider it to be the demand for the February 1895 bond as well. 
The demand function has to pass through the price at which the syndicate 
18sold the November 1894 issue (1.19). This condition, with an assumption of 
linearity (i.e. we assume p(N) = a - bN), identifies a set of possible demand 
curves. This set can be further narrowed by recognizing the existence of a 
maximum price that any individual would be willing to pay for the bond. The 
16 These results can be found in Vickery (1966), Smith (1966), and Harris and 
Raviv (1981), among others. 
17 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, February 1895. 
18 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, December 1, 1894. 
16 
maximum price has to be equal to or less than 1.24, which corresponds to a 
yield of 2.3%, the interest rate of British consols, that were expressly 
payable in gold. Moreover, the maximum price has to be greater than or equal 
to 1.21, which correspond to the slope of the linear approximation of the 
Treasury's demand function. This condition guarantees that the Syndicate's 
demand function is steeper than the one faced by the Treasury. The set of 
these demand curves is represented by the shaded area in Figure 4. The 
contracts corresponding to different demand curves in this family will be 
computed to see if any of them support the actual Belmont-Morgan contract as 
an optimal outcome. 
b. The Syndicate's Expected Profit 
The report on the November 1894 issue also contains information that can 
be used to identify the level of profit that the syndicate intended to earn, 
as a return on the underwriting services that it provided. If the Treasury 
had accepted the "all or nothing" bid, the syndicate's expected profit would 
have been: 
(8) 
where pis the expected demand function faced by the syndicate, N is the size1 
of the issue ($50 million) and p
1 is the price offered by the syndicate for 
the "all or nothing" arrangement. K is given by the area p*ABp
1 , in Figure1 
5. If, instead, the Treasury had accepted the "all or any part" offer, the 
syndicate profit would have been: 
(9) 
17 
where N is the number of one dollar bonds that the Treasury would allocate to2 
the syndicate, and p is the price offered by the syndicate under the "all or
2 
any part" arrangement. 19 K is given by-the area EACD in Figure 10. Note
2 
that the price at which the syndicate is able to sell the bonds it underwrites 
is the same under the two arrangements, that is p(N )=p(N )=1.19. If we1 2 
assume that the syndicate profit is a linear function of the number (in 
millions) of underwritten securities, 20 
K. i 1, 2 (10)
i 
equations (8) and (9) can be solved to obtain k = 0.19 and 
0 
k = 0.015. k and k are in the same units as Ki, i.e. in millions of1 0 1 
dollars. 
c. The Cost of Providing the Line of Credit 
The last piece of information needed to solve the maximization problem is 
an estimate of the cost of providing the line of credit. By providing the 
line of credit, the syndicate lost the opportunity to earn the interest that 
is obtainable by lending the gold on the London market. The cost of the 
operation in terms of the interest loss is i * G,C where i * is the six month6 6 
interest rate in London. 21 
19 The value of N =50-16.5=33.5, where 16.5 is the quantity of bonds on the2 
Treasury demand function, corresponding to p
2
. 
20 This linear form is often used in actual contracts. See Mandelker and 
Raviv (1977). 
21 Note again that six-months was the duration of the contract, i.e. the 
period during which the syndicate had to provide the line of credit. 
18 
The syndicate, in addition to the interest loss, was also bearing a 
second cost component, i.e. the capital loss that it expected in case the gold 
standard collapsed. If the Treasury were forced, by a speculative attack, to 
abandon the defense of the parity, the dollar would have been devaluated 
vis-a-vis the pound, thus increasing the price of gold. Since the syndicate, 
in providing the line of credit, was exchanging gold for dollars with the 
Treasury, it would have suffered a loss proportional to the size of the 
devaluation. This expected capital loss is given by the spread between the 
domestic and foreign interest rates, and it is represented by the interest 
parity condition. Therefore, the total cost of providing the line of credit 
can be approximated by i Gc, where i is the domestic, six month interest6 6 
rate. 
d. Solving the Maximization Problem: The Belmont-Morgan Contract 
We finally have all of the elements to solve P-2. The first order 
conditions , can be solved to give: 
N (a - k - p'(l - i - k )) / 2b (11)1 6 1 
(12) 
By substituting into (11) and (12) the values of the parameters derived 
in the previous sections, we obtain the optimal values of N and Ge 
corresponding to different demand functions in the permissible set described 
above. The results are reported in Table 3. Here bare the slopes of the 
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linear demand functions 22 N and Ge are in millions of dollars, and p(62.3) is 
the price implied by each demand curve, given that N=62.3. The values of 
b=0.0004 and b=0.001 represent the boundaries of the feasible set. However, 
since the syndicate actually sold the issue at approximately 1.125, 23 we can 
confidently concentrate our attention to the bottom part of the Table. Recall 
that in the actual contract N was $62.3 million and Ge was at least $20 
million. Therefore, our analysis produces a set of simulated contracts which 
are quite similar to the Belmont-Morgan contract. We interpret this result as 
evidence that the Treasury's borrowing policy of the 1890's was motivated by 
the desire of mantaining the gold standard and that, in so doing, it behaved 
in an efficient way. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the behavior of monetary authorities when facing an 
irnrnenent collapse of the exchange rate. In particular, it studied the 
effectiveness of borrowing international reserves to avoid devaluations. The 
attention was focussed on a particular episode, i.e. the exchange rate crisis 
of 1894-96. We concluded that borrowing policies are effective in avoiding 
temporary exchange rate crises, and that the specific borrowing policy 
followed by the U.S. Treasury in that event was not only effective but also 
optimal when considered in the light of the economic environment and the set 
of institutional and political constraints that it was facing. 
Nowadays, the procedure of borrowing from private bankers has been 
22 Remember that the intercept is the same for all demand functions, and it 
is equal to 1.19, i.e. the price at which the issue of November 1894 was sold 
by the Syndicate. 
23 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, February 1895. 
20 
replaced by the practice of obtaining lines of credit from foreign monetary 
authorities (central banks). It is interesting to note, however, how the 
basic mechanism of obtaining short-term lines of credit, instead of a formal 
long-term loan like the one introduced in the episode we considered, is still 
in operation. In fact this kind of device is institutionalized in exchange 
arrangements like the EMS where private banking syndicates are replaced by the 
pool of the central banks participating in the system. A natural extension of 
this analysis is to study the timing and the size of the borrowing of 
international reserves which occured in more recent years, in particular 
during the working of Bretton Woods and of the European Monetary System. 
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Data Appendix 
1. The money stock is given by the sum of: (i) gold coins and gold 
certificates in circulation, (ii) silver dollars, subsidiary silver coins and 
silver certificates in circulation and (iii) Treasury Notes, U.S. Notes 
(greenbacks), National Bank Notes and Currency Certificates in circulation. 
All Monetary aggregates are taken from the National Monetary Commission 
(1910). 
2. The domestic component of the money supply has been computed by 
subtracting the gold, gold certificates in circulation, and the gold reserves 
in the Treasury from the total money stock in circulation. 
3. The U.S. price index is the Warren & Pearson price index from "Index 
Number of the Wholesale Prices of all commodities, 1720 to 1932," in Warren 
and Pearson (1933), Table 1 pg. 10. 
4. The U.K. price index is the Sauerbeck price index from "Monthly 
Fluctuations of the Index Number of Forty-Five Commodities," in Sauerbeck 
(1895) and (1897). 
5 As a measure of the level of activity, I used bank clearings outside New 
York City, from Macaulay (1938), Table 27. Bank clearings represent dollar 
totals of checks and drafts drawn on individual banks and credited to the 
accounts of other banks through the city clearing house association to which 
the individual bank belonged. New York City's large volume of bank clearings 
is attributable to financial transactions that largely reflect stock and bond 
22 
transactions. As a result, bank clearings outside New York City are a more 
reliable indicator of the movement in output and trade than total clearings. 
6. The U.S. nominal interest rate is the interest rate on call loans; the 
U.K. interest rate is the interest rate allowed for deposits at call by 
Discount Houses, from the National Monetary Commission (1910) and the 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, various issues. 
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TABLE 1 
MONEY DEMAND ESTIMATE: JANUARY 1889 - DECEMBER 1896 
Parameter Estimate Standard D.W. 
Error 
f3 4.435 1.140 2.05 
'Y 0.755 0.311 
a 0.040 0.0129 
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TABLE 2 
ESTIMATES OF dct PROCESS 
al a2 a Q(20) 
Jan89-Aug90 0.359 0.945 0.009 9.22 
(0.560) (0.085) 
Sept90-0ct93 0.323 0.954 0.012 13.87 
(0.178) (0.026) 
Nov93-Dec96 0.734 0.893 0.019 16.35 
(0.449) (0.065) 
ESTIMATES OF mdt PROCESS 
al a Q(20) 
Jan89-Dec96 5.602 0.178 11.11 
(0.018) 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. Q(20) is the Q-statistics for 20 




b N Ge p(62.3) 
0.0004 140.39 55.17 1.16508 
0.0005 112.31 43.10 1.15885 
0.0006 93.60 35.05 1.15262 
0.0007 80.22 29.30 1.14639 
0.0008 70.20 24.99 1.14016 
0.0009 62.40 21.64 1.13393 
0.001 56.15 18.96 1.12770 
